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Abstract 
Recent multiethnic Lebanese history has been characterised by a high degree of tension between sectarian 
groups and the state. In a number of cases, minority groups’ resistance to localised majority groups 
developed into a manifest attempt to limit the action of the central authority by embracing alternative 
loyalties, both transnational and interreligious. Makdisi (2000) argues that in a multiconfessional Lebanon 
the old-fashioned idea of longstanding violence between competing sects is unsustainable. However, 
political microanalysis based on empirical material collected in South Lebanon during and after the 2006 
war shows that in situations where state and ethno-religious groups fail to establish a dialogue, tension 
leads citizens to view the state as alien and other groups as enemies.
With reference to Christian minority group responses, this paper looks at the ways Hizbullah post-conflict 
strategies of reconstruction have been legitimated. Considering the Weberian notion of the state’s sole 
power and Prato’s (2000) analysis of citizen loyalties to the state as a welfare provider, and reassessing 
this notion with empirical data collected in conflictual loci, this paper examines the rise of a religion-
driven movement in a scenario marked by dramatic economic transformation. The analysis suggests that 
group denial of the state’s role is most evident at a local level, where sectarian attitudes (e.g. concerning 
land or property issues) take precedence over nationally based loyalties and where this denial is the only 
perceptible means of survival for both the individual and his or her group.
Keywords: South Lebanon, christian minorities, land transaction, Hizbullah, informal economy.
Prologue
On 14 August 2006, a United Nations sponsored ceasefire went into effect in South Lebanon, thereby 
ending a 33-day conflict between the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese Shia paramilitary 
militia Hizbullah. On 15 August, as promised and extensively advertised during the war, Hizbullah began 
to rebuild or compensate for any conflict-related damage. Months later, the Lebanese government and 
some churches also started to assist with reconstruction.
Field research conducted by the author in South Lebanon before and during the 2006 war placed a 
major emphasis on Christian minority group responses to political (and ethno-religious) mobilisation 
(Mollica, 2006). Since the end of the war, however, the author has redirected his attention to the 
ways in which Hizbullah’s post-conflict political and economic strategies have been legitimated, 
leading to widespread political support and tacit accommodation. Although Hizbullah’s relief action 
was financed by unknown sources, it was available to the entire community regardless of religious 
affiliation. Here formal and informal practices met publicly and were publicly accepted. Thus, the 
overall debate over post-war reconstruction in Lebanon raises the question of whether there should 
have been constraints upon accepting money from a paramilitary (and as such illegal) organisation, 
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which is also a political (and as such legal) movement. Furthermore, it is unclear how certain recipients 
(such as, in this case, Christian minorities) could justify the acceptance of money from a militia with 
unclear political objectives that claimed to represent the nation but was chosen along sectarian lines. 
Introduction
During the 2006 war, the author was in Lebanon with a Christian group trapped in a Christian enclave 
on the Israeli border. The Hizbullah TV channel Al Manar was available due to two hours of daily 
electricity provided by a local generator. During periods of intense bombing, Al Manar’s spokespeople 
repeatedly said, “We will rebuild everything they destroy”. Based on the extent of the damage, it was 
difficult to see how that could be possible either logistically or financially. Nevertheless, after the 
war concluded, Hizbullah followed through on its promise. At the end of the summer war1 between 
Hizbullah and Israel, Hizbullah’s clerical leadership celebrated a ‘divine’ victory with victory rallies 
throughout Lebanon, Syria and Iran. Linked financially, militarily and theologically with Shia Iran,2 
Hizbullah was to polarise Lebanon, deepening the divide between its many groups and substantially 
damaging national cohesion (Mollica, 2010).
Hizbullah had attacked an Israeli unit, calling the action ‘Operation Truthful Promise’. Hizbullah 
claimed that Israel had broken a deal to release prisoners and that violent action was the only response 
left to them. In keeping with a longstanding request, Hizbullah asked for an Israeli withdrawal from the 
so-called Shebaa Farms, predicating the legitimacy of its resistance to Israel on the basis of liberating 
occupied land. In fact, the roots of Hizbullah go back to the Movement of the Deprived founded by 
the Iranian-Lebanese philosopher Imam Moussa Sadr (Ajami, 1985): a socio-economic movement that 
reorganised the Lebanese Shia community in the 1970s as a reaction to the decomposition of the rural 
Lebanese world and growing urbanisation. However, it was also a political movement against Israel, 
claiming to act for all the ‘deprived’ beyond sectarianism (Nasr, 1985).
Officially, Israel retaliated against Hizbullah’s seizure of two of its soldiers. Israel called the Hizbullah 
attack an act of war and promised a painful response. However, Israel clarified that this action was not 
against Lebanon. The Lebanese government denied any involvement in the kidnappings, despite the 
fact that the Lebanese consociational model gives every religious component, including Shia groups, 
representation in the Executive (Kerr, 2005). Such a situation created a serious blackout within the 
government as some ministers supported Hizbullah action.
The Israeli-Lebanese war ended on 14 August 2006, when the United Nations Security Council 
unanimously approved Resolution 1701, which put an end to the hostilities on the basis of a seven-
point plan that increased the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in southern Lebanon 
(known as UNIFIL) and called for the disarming of all militias. However, Hizbullah did not return the 
bodies of the two captured Israeli soldiers (kidnapped during the action that started the war in the 
early morning of 12 July 2006) until two years later (on 17 July 2008). The exchange, involving Hizbullah 
and Palestinian prisoners and the bodies of about 200 other militants, was part of a wider bargain 
struck with the Israeli authorities.3
What follows is mostly concerned with follow-up field research (including a dozen semi-
structured interviews with both Christian political and Maronite and Greek Catholic religious leaders 
and entrepreneurs) conducted from 2010 to 2013. The content also includes a local assessment, 
1 Despite hundreds of thousands of displaced Israelis, important economic implications and a war cost of $1.6 
billion (Borger, 2006), the Israeli government only defined the conflict as a ‘war’ on 25 March 2007.
2 Hizbullah’s clerically led executive and political councils were integrated after the war, with two organs added 
to the Jihad Council: the Auxiliary Units (an irregular militia) and the Lebanese Defense Brigades (a cross-
sectarian militia) (Rabil, 2008).
3 On that day, the coffins said to contain the remains of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were taken to the 
Israel-Lebanon border (Haaretz, 17 July 2008).
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via participant observation, with reference to the trajectory of that initial Hizbullah promise and 
the behavioural changes of the Christians who accompanied the author during the war, with an 
emphasis on the ways they reacted to Hizbullah money. This Christian population had no connection 
to Hizbullah. However, the dynamics of the amalgamation of formal and informal funding sources 
linked to the reconstruction would involve the entire community.
The Provider
Hizbullah policy was in line with what Eicklman (2001, p. 331) terms ‘new Muslim politics’, where 
‘being Muslim’ plays a role in the way people think “collectively and concretely about themselves 
and their society” [author’s italics]. This ‘new’ Muslim politics is thus ideological and, by implication, 
aims at a wider audience. Levitt (2006) explains a similar dynamic by looking at the relationship 
between Hamas social services and associated political activism. Other examples can be found both 
in the region and beyond. In Islamic countries such as Turkey, pro-Islamist parties (e.g. Welfare in the 
mid-1990s and the Justice and Development Party [AKP] later on) are well known for their informal 
but effective charity work (Delibaş, 2009), whereas in other regions the relationship between formal 
welfare providers and the people have been shaped by structural factors (Kasearu & Kutsar, 2010; 
Polese, Morris, Nodelsen, & Kovacs, 2014; Requena, 2013) or the emergence of new donors (Hristova 
Kurzydlowski, 2013; Connolly & Sicard, 2012). Dingley (2009) comes to similar conclusions by reference 
to (Provisional) Sinn Féin’s informal welfare system in Northern Irish Republican–held sectors. In 
addition, the challenges to the political order and its subsequent reproduction in the management 
of public resources have been investigated by Kassimir (2001, p. 96-99) in his analysis of a Christian 
Ugandan NGO assuming ‘state-like’ functions. Other works of detailed ethnographic comparative 
research on insurgent groups interacting with social service systems in conflictual loci are addressed 
in Kevlihan (2007, 2013) and Metelits (2010), the latter also presenting the means used to achieve 
strategic aims in insurgent-held areas (ranging from the use of violence to providing public goods).
Prior to the 2006 war, Hizbullah was well known for its social service institutions, which were 
located in predominantly Shia areas but traditionally served anyone requesting help. Much of the 
funding was raised domestically, but Hizbullah also received alleged subsidies from Iran. Several 
Hizbullah-sponsored societies are actually branches of Iranian organisations. Others were created by 
Hizbullah, most notably the Jehad al Benaa [Reconstruction Campaign] Developmental Organisation, 
which repaired much of the war damage.4
With reference to Iran, some sources report that Iranian support of Hizbullah has angered many 
Iranians waiting for money to rebuild homes damaged by wars or natural disasters. However, Iranian 
officials insist that Iran’s support of Hizbullah is moral, not material (Zadeh, 2006; Nasrallah, 2012). 
Nevertheless, a widely used slogan during the 2009 Iranian protest (the so-called Green Revolution) 
was: “Money to Iran, not to Hizbullah”.
In 2006, Hizbullah was put to an extraordinary test. The party’s actions showed competence that 
won extensive support among many Lebanese. Support for Hizbullah was, however, increased by the 
bombing of mosques and churches and the use of illegal weapons by the Israelis (Jamail, 2006; Mollica, 
2006). Evidence of Hizbullah’s efficient grassroots social service network, as opposed to services 
provided by the Lebanese government, was visible everywhere (Kifner, 2006; Mollica, 2006). Hizbullah 
4 Hizbullah ran construction companies, schools, hospitals, dispensaries and microfinance initiatives, such as 
the al-Qard al-Hasan [Good Loan], which in early 2007 could offer some 750 small loans a month. Other Iranian 
branches’ organisations were: the Islamic Charity Emdad, the Martyr’s Association and the Association for 
the Wounded. Other Hizbullah organizations were the Hizbullah Women’s Committee and the Islamic Health 
Committee (Norton, 2007; Rishani, 2012).
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was already running community projects in what the South Lebanese perceived to be the absence 
of the Lebanese government. Hizbullah had a good reputation as a well-ordered social organisation 
and surprised many people with how quickly it mobilised its organisational machine (Besheer, 2006; 
Hizbullah launches reconstruction jihad, 2006).
During the war, Hizbullah never stopped advertising its intention to repair all war-related damage. 
Some Hizbullah opponents questioned whether the reconstruction work Hizbullah was showing on 
television was real (Hollander, 2006), since Hizbullah began its reconstruction program with a heavy 
dose of propaganda. According to Cambanis (2006), some Hizbullah activists even claimed credit for 
work carried out by the government’s civil defence service.
The Damage
The 2006 war severely damaged the Lebanese infrastructure (including Rafiq Hariri Beirut International 
Airport, ports, schools and hospitals), displaced almost one million Lebanese, and ended the lives of 
1,300 people (Norwegian Refugee Council Report, 2006). In addition, the war left large areas of territory 
littered with unexploded cluster bombs and had a substantial impact on the Lebanese economy.5 The 
damage was estimated at $3.6 billion (Harris, 2012, p. 271). On 30 January 2008, however, the Israeli 
government’s Winograd Commission (Winograd Committee, 2008, January 30) concluded that the 
IDF had committed no violation, as claimed by others – e.g. the Amnesty International Report (2006, 
August 23).
Despite the heavy fighting, however, Hizbullah survived the conflict and was on the ground at the 
end of the war. On 14 September 2006, the Economist wrote, “The speed, efficiency and propaganda 
of Hizbullah’s reconstruction offensive have caught Lebanon’s flimsy government off the mark, and 
helped bolster the party’s popularity beyond its core Shia supporters”.
Hizbullah reconstruction efforts created an uncertain scenario, since it was a crucial political 
victory (Rabil, 2008). These efforts were possible because of an immediate influx of money to the 
movement. In his victory speech, Hizbullah’s Secretary General Sheik Hassan Nasrallah said, 
“Completing the victory can come with reconstruction”. Almost immediately, “hundreds of Hizbullah 
members spread over dozens of villages across southern Lebanon cleaning and surveying damage” 
(Kifner, 2006).
In Lebanon, Nasrallah’s credibility was unquestioned, even by many Christian informants whom 
the author spoke to who strongly opposed Hizbullah. Nasrallah was and still is seen as a serious 
political leader, portrayed even by his opponents as someone who never lies.
The damage in southern Lebanonwas severe, both in areas where the Israeli and Hizbullah 
ground forces fought and where the IDF operated. The 23 August 2006, Amnesty International 
Report documented streets scarred with artillery craters and damage from the targeting of houses, 
supermarkets, auto service stations and petrol stations. In some villages, the damage affected 50% of 
all structures (Arkin, 2007).
The author himself can confirm that there were at least three weeks of continuous bombings 
(including cluster bombs) and strikes, which he witnessed from a ferro-concrete room in the southern 
Christian enclave of Alma el-Shaab, where he was trapped while doing fieldwork in the summer of 
2006 (Mollica, 2006, 2008, 2010).
5 The Lebanese government officially reported nearly 120,000 homes destroyed or damaged, 862 schools de-
stroyed and 91 demolished bridges (IRIN Report, 2007, September 2), although these data have been contested 
(Arkin, 2007).
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Alma el-Shaab
Alma el-Shaab, the author’s main locus of research, has a voting population of around 2,400. However, 
some 1,000 Almawy (as locals call themselves) live outside its borders, either in Beirut or Tyre or outside 
Lebanon (Gulf states, USA, Europe). The highest voter turnout percentage in municipal elections has 
been around 70%, and the percentage decreases sharply for national elections. It is also difficult to 
tell how many votes come from persons who visit on weekends or for the summer. Most of them live 
in the Christian quarters of Tyre or Beirut. Neither the mayor nor the deputy mayor live in the village, 
and the mayor does not even live in Lebanon.
The population of the village consists of Maronites, Greek Catholics and Protestants. A similar 
religious amalgamation can be found in the author’s other field site, the Christian quarter of Tyre, also 
home to a Latin and Greek Orthodox population.
Abuna [Father] Marun, the Maronite priest of Alma el-Shaab, was the only parish priest in town 
during the war. He states,
My mission is to be with the population. If people stay here, I cannot leave. In Lebanon we have the 
example of 1948 and the followings (sic), when the Palestinians left their country. Being here is also 
being with the land [author’s italics]. During the war we had Holy Mass. The bell was ringing. However, 
nobody can make an obligation and force people to stay. It is a personal and moral decision. (Abuna 
Marun, Alma el-Shaab Maronite parish priest)
By the end of the war, Alma had 50 destroyed houses, 120 damaged houses, one death and ten 
injuries. No damage was reported in the Christian quarter of Tyre. Since then, locals have been 
struggling to avoid direct political involvement. Given the instability of regional and national scenarios, 
they oppose the establishment of any national party branch in the village area.
If we give the right to have one party [branch], then there will be ten in one day. (Informant living in 
Alma)
Thus, they do not have political parties. When Hizbullah leaders want to communicate with the 
locals, they speak to their leaders (i.e. priests, Muhtar [head of village]). The locals are well aware of 
this.
We do not know for how long we can go on. Hizbullah is very intelligent. (Informant living in Alma).
Hizbullah has made and maintains a good impression on many strata of the Lebanese population. 
At the end of the war, Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s Secretary General, said, “We cannot wait for 
the government and its heavy vehicles and machinery because they could come in a while”. He also 
cautioned, “No one should raise prices due to a surge in demand” (Kifner, 2006). Soon after, some 
areas were closed by Hizbullah for fear of theft; residents were allowed to enter only after being 
issued special passes (Hundreds of, 2006, August 16; author’s informants’ personal communications). 
As Nasrallah had promised, his party was to lead the reconstruction effort (Cambanis, 2006).
They opened their bags
On the very day the ceasefire went into effect, Nasrallah appeared on television and promised to 
help the Lebanese rebuild their houses, pay their rent, and/or buy furniture. He did not say where 
the money would come from, but Hizbullah had already been using Iranian money to fund charity 
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work and social welfare programs (Manyok, 2013). A few hours later, hundreds of Lebanese reported 
damage estimates to Hizbullah agents (Djansezian, 2006). By the next day, Nasrallah was able to give 
a precise accounting of damage and officially launch a rebuilding program.
Hizbullah’s move to take a leading role in post-conflict reconstruction is consistent with ongoing 
tensions between the movement and the Lebanese state as both strive to build or maintain legitimacy. 
Hizbullah was already challenging the state in what was supposed to be the state’s exclusive domain of 
power, that is, pace Weber (1919), the use of force as a legitimate means.6 Hizbullah does not officially 
claim any section of the state, not even in areas where non-Shia communities are demographically 
insignificant, nor has Hizbullah ever represented itself as an alternative to the central state and its 
authority. Hizbullah’s resistance to an occupying force, that is Israel, was officially made with the 
exclusive intention of defending Lebanon from Israeli incursions, and the legitimacy of its use of 
force was predicated on that basis. On the one hand, however, in Hizbullah-held quarters and sectors 
(mostly in South Lebanon, Beirut city and the Bequaa Valley) the contradictions and failure of the 
Lebanese consociational model are manifest, because this political group maintains a military branch 
(Mollica, 2010). On the other hand, in line with a point raised by Magouirk (2008) considering other 
conflictual areas, Hizbullah utilises social service activities and anti-corruption campaigns to gain 
support by promising to be a better distributor of resources and public services than the current 
regime, thereby exercising non-violent power.
During the 2006 war, Hizbullah continued to use force despite international pressure and 
resolutions from the state and the United Nations. After the war, however, Hizbullah increased its 
support to the Lebanese population, since the state was perceived as absent. Hizbullah was a major 
actor in the welfare system (Mollica, 2008, 2010), operating in place of the state in a moment of 
crisis, at a time when state support should have been stronger. On the one hand, it represented the 
translation of a social struggle into religious codes. Here the use of religious symbolism returned 
to the collective memory of the community. The same symbols used for the charismatic cult of the 
Imam Moussa Sadr (Nasr, 1985, p. 144-145) in the 1970s were now directed towards Nasrallah. On the 
other hand, the party could now broaden its base support beyond religious lines. People did not care 
where Hizbullah’s money came from, and Hizbullah was soon able to provide precise data on future 
relief efforts. For a lost home, compensation was made in two parts with a maximum of $40,000, or 
one part if under $8,000, plus rent (IRIN Report, 2007, September 2). After all, the cost of the war was 
going to be extremely high, as stated by a report submitted by the Lebanese government to the Paris 
III Conference in January 2007. Some 50,000 families had been financially affected by the war (MEMRI 
Report, 2007, July 22), including Christians, most of whom were living in the south and perceived 
themselves as a minority, geographically isolated from the Christians in Central and North Lebanon. 
However, Hizbullah would eventuallyalso turn its attention to them.
Hizbullah rebuilt everything. They finished everything. They gave money even to people who did not have 
damage. Many even lied to get money. Depending on the damage, they paid from $100 to $60,000. Later 
they even paid for the trees: from $100 to $200 per each tree. In Alma they gave money to 50 families. 
They also paid some $20,000 for animals, for we have two big farms for cows and chickens. Hizbullah, 
we assume, got money from Iran and paid in US dollars, brand new, in packets with serial numbers from 
bank, brought in black bags. They came without weapons, three on a car, with the money. They opened 
the bag in the municipality and gave money to those who signed in to get compensation. Hizbullah paid 
6 Weber (1919) defines the modern state in terms of its peculiar means, “as to every political association, namely, 
the use of physical force”, thus stressing the relation between state and violence as an intimate one. A state is 
“a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a 
given territory”, territory being just one of the characteristics of the state. However, the right to make use of 
physical force may be given “to other institutions or to individuals”, but “only to the extent to which the state 
permits it’, for the state is the ‘sole source of the right to use violence”.
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even for injuries and casualties. Some took advantage, for instance, dividing a house into two units, to 
get double the money. Some signed without damage. Some got $1,000 for a damaged glass. (Informant 
from Alma, living in Beirut)
The situation was similar in the Tyre city centre:
They [Hizbullah] rebuilt everything and even paid the rent for five years. They paid for every casualty. 
Hizbullah made houses better than before. If there was a damaged house, Hizbullah came. Someone 
says that they did the list [author’s italics] with the government. (Informant from Tyre)
Hizbullah wanted to show that they dealt with all [religious] groups. To clarify the point, they went 
to Christian villages and Christian quarters. They had to show their moderate face. Everybody knew 
they were paying, including UNIFIL. However, giving money to Christians was a small thing and did 
not change their wider aim. Christian villages and Christian quarters that got money do not have any 
power. Hizbullah already has its hands on these areas. It would not change their [Christians’] situation. 
Without law or governments they [the Christians] are sheep in their [Hizbullah’s] hands. We could be 
immediately forced to leave our houses. (Informant from Alma with an economic activity in Tyre)
After the war we had no roads, no electricity and no water. The majority of our population had problems 
with houses. People did not know if they had to wait or if they should return. It was tough. We suffer 
more as a population. We live on the border. At the beginning, I was against getting money. I told the 
municipality that before getting money, it would be better to make a damage assessment. (Abuna 
Marun, Alma el-Shaab Maronite parish priest)
Clearly, local religious authorities were concerned about the dynamics, not the idea, of Hizbullah 
distributing money. Christians understood that in the short term no one except Hizbullah was going 
to help. Thus, they accepted the money without constraint, wherever it came from. The Christians’ 
concern was for the long term, for whether accepting money would jeopardise their freedom – a 
freedom already threatened by negative demographic trends. They wondered if there were any limits 
to the religious community’s influence over its members. Moreover, the situation raised questions 
about the relationship between religious attitudes of South Lebanese Christians and their economic 
actions (in this case, the acceptance of money from Hizbullah). An informant from Alma living in 
Beirut clarifies the point:
The first village that got paid was Alma. It was one the worst hit Christian villages. They started paying 
the day after the war ended. It was because it was a Christian village. Everyone accepted money, 
exception done for the churches. People afraid of not receiving money from the government accepted 
Hizbullah money. A local religious leader suggested not accepting. People asked him if he could find 
money instead. He said he could not. End of discussion. (Informant from Alma, living in Beirut)
To paraphrase Mill ([1859] 2010, p. 12), those holding power are not always the same people 
over whom power is exercised, above all in reference to religious people and the local dimension 
of this power. But Christians have not signed any pact to give power to their community, or to any 
recently overarching sovereign body that they, pace Rousseau, have helped to establish. The problem, 
however, lies in the liminal terrain that marks the local and the national dimension; it is felt even 
more when (ethno-religious) loyalties become transnational and transnational affiliations are seen 
as incompatible. Some informants help define the parameters of this incompatibility by referencing 
Hizbullah’s ‘honesty’ and comparing Hizbullah to other political groups.
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There are differences, of course. Amal [the other Shia party, whose leader is the current President of 
the Chamber, Nabih Berry] was getting money from the government [here the reference is to criticisms 
that Amal allegedly participated in activities, such as trafficking, nepotism and providing employment 
to unqualified persons, as was happening in other parties]. Hizbullah was getting money from Iran. 
Hizbullah had a team, with some sub-teams for the evaluation of the damage. (Informant from Alma 
with an economic activity in Tyre)
Hizbullah’s payments were unconditional. They did not want anything in return, such as their own 
builders for the work of construction. After all, in Alma there is just one local constructor and one 
painting company. Companies came from surrounding villages of various religious denominations. 
Hizbullah had names for builders and furniture costs. There was no control. Later, much later, the 
Lebanese government gave money. At the beginning, it was just half of the amount. Then they set up a 
commission to assess the work. Finally, if proved that it was properly done, they gave the remaining. 
However, even for the government, there was no control. (Informant from Alma living in Beirut)
Hizbullah was seen as a reliable political party because the behaviour of its members was strictly 
religious. There was no doubt about this. Party members could not be involved in any illegal activity, 
as might be the case with anyone else (including other Shia groups).
One must ask how Hizbullah could manage the funding in order to avoid any control, assuming 
someone would dare to exert financial control.
Imagine you own a house and you rent two shops. If the total value was $50,000, Hizbullah would give 
you the sum and you would look after the reconstruction. Otherwise, Hizbullah might give you a sum 
to pay the rent for one year, and then they would look after the reconstruction. That’s what happened 
in Tyre. Hizbullah made contacts with some companies, such as Waad [Promise], a Hizbullah-controlled 
company. In Tyre, the majority preferred to have the house reconstructed and got the rent. (Informant 
from Alma living in Tyre)
Hizbullah gave millions of dollars in cash. Those making claims only had to bring their identification 
cards and proof that they owned or rented a damaged or destroyed house or apartment. In most cases, 
people received compensation within 48 hours. Hizbullah did not differentiate on religious grounds 
(Besheer, 2006). Hizbullah paid for all damages or sent their workers to do the job (The Economist, 
2006, September 14). Critics were persistent in asking about the source of Hizbullah money. The party 
maintained that the money came from donations (Besheer, 2006). But, as a matter of fact, many 
emergency generators were sent by Iran, and temporary water tanks were set up by foreign donor 
agencies (Fox News, 2006, August 16; author’s informants’ personal communications). Flush with cash 
from Islamic charities and Shia groups, Hizbullah was able to hire contractors and give money to the 
displaced even before the shooting stopped. Party officials described the budget as ‘without limit’. In 
the meantime, the Lebanese government continued to discuss its own reconstruction plan and search 
for reconstruction financing from Western and Arab donors (Cambanis, 2006). On the other hand, it 
announced no plans to assist the homeless and displaced (Besheer, 2006).
Hizbullah deployed its machinery, hundreds of engineers and thousands of workers across the 
country, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars (Cambanis, 2006), while utilising its controlled 
company Waad to channel Iranian funds into rehabilitation activities. According to Israeli sources, 
Iran’s emissaries brought suitcases stuffed with dollars and distributed $12,000 in cash to every Shia 
family whose house had been destroyed and who had applied for assistance (Shapira, 2009). In less 
than a week, Hizbullah’s effort surpassed the central government’s bureaucracy. The group was ready 
to enter the country’s post-war political dynamics (Cambanis, 2006). After all, Hizbullah had declared 
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a sort of war against Israel, de facto replacing the authority of the state. Hizbullah also seemed 
poised to replace the Lebanese government as the legitimate welfare authority (a role the group was, 
informally, already playing).
Replacing the State
Hizbullah directed the reconstruction work while ignoring the central government, which reinforced 
its influence well beyond the Shia community (Shapira, 2009). Nasrallah could even legitimise 
Hizbullah’s unknown funding sources against the known funding sources of the Lebanese government. 
On the first anniversary of the ceasefire, Nasrallah could easily accuse the government of delaying 
compensation, saying that while the state had received $1 billion to assist individuals harmed by the 
war, Hizbullah had already spent $381 million (IRIN Report, 2007, September 2). Some countries, such 
as Qatar, managed projects directly, adopting border villages; meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates 
restored many schools, and Iran alone assumed some 1,300 projects (IRIN Report, 2007, September 2). 
After all, the receipt of substantial foreign aid following a crisis was nothing new to modern Lebanese 
history (Gaspard, 2004, p. 216).
At the 2007 Paris III Conference, the Lebanese government submitted a reform program to 
stimulate growth, create employment and maintain socio-political stability. However, caught in a 
daily struggle for its own survival, the government could do little to implement its project. Dissatisfied 
with the Lebanese government’s performance, donors withheld part of the promised funds (MEMRI 
Report, 2008, July 22).
Then the Lebanese government arrived and paid for the real cost. So people got money twice. For political 
reasons, the government wanted to show that they were responsible for its citizens. The government got 
money from Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. But they stole half of the money. The Lebanese government 
paid in checks and Lebanese liras; Hizbullah paid in cash and US dollars. (Informant from Alma living in 
Beirut)
Government delays and perceptions of endemic corruption and widespread incapability 
(legitimated by the international community withdrawing part of the promised funding) increased 
the scepticism of the Lebanese towards the central state. Distrust was greatest within communities 
whose loyalties were already weak. Given this background, the Lebanese affected by the war did not 
want to lose the opportunity to get some money.
The village of Alma, for instance, also got help from other organisations and private groups. The Greek 
Catholic Church paid $500 per family; the Protestant Church paid half of the real cost. Thus, some got 
two and a half the real damage. (Informant from Alma living in Beirut)
However, in keeping with a trend common all over the Middle East (Mollica, 2011), land continued 
to be the main concern of South Lebanese Christians. Changing demographic trends increased people’s 
attachment to land. The land became an extension of their ethno-religious identity. Meanwhile, 
Hizbullah’s incursion was changing the Shia community’s behaviour and status. The Shia community 
was quickly moving from being the poorest economic religious group to the strongest demographic 
component.
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Christian Land
After the war, land transactions became a priority within the Christian community. Christians from 
the village of Alma el-Shaab refused to sell land or houses to Christians from other villages, let alone 
to non-Christians.
The Muhtar will not sign. We elect the Muhtar the same day we elect the mayor. He primarily looks after 
personal affairs [such as births or marriages]. However, in areas with no topographic records, he is also 
responsible for land transactions. In Alma he has three assistants, also elected with him. He can stop the 
transaction, for we have an understanding. (Informant from Alma with an economic activity in Tyre)
The concept was clarified by another informant:
Anyone willing to buy a lot [of land] must go to the Muhtar and sign a paper. The agreement is that the 
Muhtar will not allow the transaction unless the buyer is from Alma. Even Christians who are not from 
Alma cannot buy. (Informant from Alma living in Beirut)
The Maronite priest stressed the point:
Look, we have good relations with the other villages, not extremely good but good. We receive courtesy 
visits and we reciprocate. However, we must protect our land, for we do not have weapons. Here it is 
not possible to sell. We have an agreement with the Muhtar. Land just for the people of Alma. (Abuna 
Marun, Alma el-Shaab Maronite parish priest)
The same priest was aware of what could be happening:
Maybe, in the future, if someone asks for land… you know… people may lose their relation with land. 
We have the United Nations to help with money, but they do not provide work opportunities. After the 
war some families left Alma. Demographic figures are substantially stable; we even increase during the 
summer. We do ask our families to increase, although, at the end of the day, this is a family decision. Our 
land in South Lebanon is holy. We were here from the beginning. It is a reason for us to stay. Some people 
have strong links with the land, the houses, the cemeteries. (Abuna Marun, Alma el-Shaab Maronite 
parish priest)
As a leading figure in Alma explained, the people of Alma are forced to engineer ways to protect 
their land:
Last year, three girls living in Beirut inherited some properties in Alma. Someone had to ask a rich 
Almawy, now living in Dubai, to buy the land. Many lost their relation [author’s italics] with the land 
and could sell. (Informant from Alma)
A dramatic event closely tied to the issue of land took place in March of 2010 in the Christian village 
of Qaa. The event had a deep impact on the Christian population of Alma el-Shaab. The following is an 
account of that story as told by an informant from Alma:
In Qaa [a Greek Catholic village, 135 kilometres from Beirut, on the Syrian border, close to Hermel] there 
is a large estate today belonging to the state. In the past, you could plant on it. Then the law changed 
and now you cannot plant anymore. Then, there is a Sunni village, Arsaal [some 45 kilometres from Qaa]. 
Years ago, people from Arsaal bought some land in that area at a very cheap price. People from Arsaal 
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now live there; they have sheep and goats. One day someone from Arsaal brought his sheep on Qaa land. 
A 70-year-old Qaa man told him not to bring the sheep because they destroy the trees. The Arsaal man 
called another person from Arsaal and told him the story. This man and other two came and killed the 
old man. Before he died, he gave the names of the killers. They escaped. In protest, Qaa men stopped the 
main road and asked the government to get the killers. Arsaal leaders came to say sorry in Qaa. God 
bless the soul of the deceased, but Qaa people are now paying for the mistake they made many years 
ago by selling their land.
The price to be paid
Officially, Hizbullah has no interest in land, despite its increasing membership and conflicting relations 
with other groups at the local level. Hizbullah tries, in fact, to maintain a national dimension to 
its struggle. Waad, for instance, is a branch of Hizbullah’s reconstruction arm, Jihad al-Bina. It was 
named after the so-called ‘truthful promise’, the name given by Nasrallah to the capture of two Israeli 
soldiers on 12 July 2006. Waad completed all works in 2009, granting about $10,000 per each family that 
had lost property. In contrast, the Lebanese government granted about $53,000 to individual citizens 
whose units were destroyed and compensated for damaged property on a case-by-case basis. The 
process was apparently slowed because many people lacked legal documents for properties that were 
built illegally, and many others lost documents during the war.
Keeping in mind the larger issue of land transaction, Hizbullah’s speed engendered in many 
Christians the fear that there would be a price to pay, sooner or later.
All houses have been repaired. Hizbullah at the beginning was very rude [the reference is to the civil 
war]. Everybody thought they were going to make an Islamic country, even if it was never said publicly. 
But in Lebanon it is not easy to establish that kind of state. Hizbullah understood that they couldn’t 
establish a country like Iran yet. Today, they [Hizbullah] keep their weapons for two reasons: first, to 
keep the Shia in their hands, present themselves as saviours [author’s italics] and have an impact in 
electoral terms; second, since they are closer to Iran than Lebanon, being the strongest, they still have 
a long-term aim. Even the Lebanese army soldiers, in case they have to decide, would follow their Shia 
leaders. You see… it would be enough a fatwā [a religious opinion that in Shia tradition can be binding] 
as it happened during the civil war [1975-1990]. (Informant from Alma with an economic activity in Tyre)
The 2006 war showed how Christians were completely unarmed and weaker than ever:
Our people are afraid. If they hear about a war,7 they immediately leave their houses. When something 
happens, everyone leaves Alma. (Abuna Marun, Alma el-Shaab Maronite parish priest)
Other Christian informants hold a different view, born from a fear of a failing central state:
After every war, the government comes and says that they will pay, but then they do not. This time, 
when Hizbullah came, people immediately said yes. Not everyone signed in, of course, so not every 
damaged house got money. But I am sure not one of those who got money thinks that they have a debt 
with Hizbullah. (Informant from Alma living in Beirut)
7 As happened on 8 January 2009, when two rockets fired from South Lebanon hit the Israeli town of Nahariya, 
wounding two people. As was later proven, the attack came from a paramilitary Palestinian group, while Hiz-
bullah assured the Lebanese government that it was not responsible. However, Israel promptly retaliated with 
five shells.
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In 2009, before the national elections, and while Hizbullah militants were demonstrating against 
former Sunni Prime Minister Fuad Saniora, the universal language of cash outweighed sectarianism 
in the south. In the Shia village of Bint Jbeil, Sunni Qatar helped to repair all the religious buildings, 
including the Grand Mosque. Despite alleged government-imposed obstacles, Shia Iran helped with 
rebuilding Lebanon, and its engineers oversaw the reconstruction of schools, hospitals and places of 
worship (including ten churches and some Sunni mosques) (Macleod, 2007).
However, it was the relief machine set up by Hizbullah that worked:
Hizbullah buys everything in Lebanon, for instance, cement. It is a ramified organisation, radicated in 
the territory, with restaurants and shops. Some of these were used to launder money. For instance, a 
restaurant can say its income was $60,000 in one month, while it was nothing. In this way they can accu-
mulate money in banks. No one will ask. The state does not check. (Informant from Alma living in Tyre)
Clearly, as with the movement of Imam Sadr, the relationship between Hizbullah and Lebanon as 
a whole was one of identification-appropriation: patriotic and willing to save Lebanon from suffer-
ing (Nasr, 1985, p. 137-138). Meanwhile, the Israeli enemy was represented as ‘evil’, even in religious 
terms. Today, the external enemy is still Israel, and the internal enemies are still the leading elites 
of Lebanon. However, social aims are presented as priorities (here more efficient distribution of 
resources), followed by political aims (here increasing political participation among the growing Shia 
community).
Three years after the war, the Lebanese government reported some $676 million spent on repairing 
damage to houses. The money came mainly through donations from countries like Saudi Arabia ($306 
million) and Kuwait ($89 million). Tehran channelled hundreds of millions of dollars for re con struc-
tion through Shia organisations and Hizbullah. However, it is difficult to say how much of this money 
went toward rebuilding the Dahiya, the organisation’s military facilities, and its military capabilities. 
Hizbullah claims that the Lebanese government demonstrated weakness. The criticism mainly refers to 
the fact that Lebanese industrialists and farmers have not received compensation. However, according 
to the government, 93% of the sum was used to rebuild some 113,000 houses, mainly in southern 
Lebanon and in the Hizbullah stronghold. Finally, as Israeli sources argue, the Lebanese government 
gave about $94 million to the families of ‘martyrs’ and people who were injured, while two countries 
with tense relations with the Lebanese government (Syria and Qatar) directly transferred funds to the 
owners of damaged houses (Peskin, 2009).
Conclusions
In the 1970s, the Shia Imam Moussa Sadr taught that violence against internal Lebanese opponents 
must be rejected, while violence against the external enemy must be actively sought. Today, Sadr’s 
heirs are struggling to balance their position between these two extremes. For the first time, however, 
extensive financial support placed the party in a position where it had to demonstrate managerial 
capabilities beyond religious lines.
Aside from the widely held belief that only a small portion of the money received by Hizbullah was 
used for relief purposes, many were concerned that the source of money was unknown. However, 
individuals who received the benefits (both Christians and Muslims) and the companies that received 
the money (both Christian and Muslim) never asked about it. But this South Lebanese ethnography 
raises another question that must be answered. Were the people giving the money part-time terrorists 
or not? Were they ‘terrorists’ only when perceived as acting along traditional Lebanese sectarian lines 
or even when giving money to anyone asking for it? After all, commerce in weapons is illegal, and 
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giving money that likely came from the same donor is also illegal. The money simply had a different 
aim and a different impact – and probably brought different expectations that the Christians of South 
Lebanon could easily appreciate themselves. This was especially true because, pace Pascal, there was 
no mediator (between Hizbullah and civilian Christians), and without mediation there cannot be an 
equal exchange.
First of all, post-war reconstruction efforts put Hizbullah under pressure. This was a test. As such, 
it meant huge involvement, control and deliverance. The party proved its structure, parallel as it 
was to the state. Hizbullah could deliver immediately. In the end, it was not the target of a single 
accusation, despite the fact that it used cash without giving receipts. The money was accepted by 
everyone (including Christians), the work was done well and no bribery was involved. When the 
war ended, Hizbullah men were carrying money in their cars in South Lebanon the very next day, 
and without escorts or weapons. Illegal money became legitimate by its very use, by the vacuum 
created by the state, and by the reliability of Hizbullah. No one complained about the money. Some 
informants told the author that they were happy to receive money from Hizbullah. Anyone who asked 
for money received it, even if only to replace a broken window.
Second, political loyalties in Lebanon have never been stable, especially during times of war. For 
centuries, South Lebanese Christians have lived in close proximity to their Shia Muslim neighbours. 
Alliances have often shifted, however. After the 2006 war, Hizbullah’s relief actions surely caused some 
Christians to change sides. However, many of them shifted alliances when they found themselves 
trapped in the middle of Israel’s war against Hizbullah, which eventually turned into a war against 
Lebanese civilians, regardless of their religious affiliations.
Third, the most important issue remained land. Christians accepting money (even money from 
potentially illegal sources) made some of them weaker in reference to land transaction and land usage 
in a highly sectarian society that is deeply affected by dramatic demographic change. The Christians 
interviewed by the author argued that they would not change their behaviour, as the case of Alma el-
Shaab proves. They are, however, forced to devise ways to defend their land. In order to do so, they are 
willing to remain within the boundaries of Lebanese law. However, the fact that the state was ‘absent’ 
and that Christians received help (at least initially) either mostly or exclusively from Hizbullah, caused 
Christians to find themselves indebted to Hizbullah. They believe they are already weak and that it 
would be easy for Hizbullah to force them to leave. Furthermore, until Hizbullah’s post-2006 war relief 
effort, these Christians had never accepted money, nor were they felt to be the weaker link between 
the Lebanese religious groups.
Finally, relief strengthened ties between Hizbullah and Iran but also brought new perspectives 
of Christian-Iranian relations in South Lebanon. While before the 2006 war some Christians fought 
Hizbullah and saw Israel as a natural Western ally, and many more thought that their loyalties to their 
central government were unshakable, relations have recently been significantly reframed.
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